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Abstract: This paper revisits the Kareken-Wallace model of exchange rate formation in a two-
country overlapping generations world. Following the seminal paper by Arifovic ( Journal of 
Political Economy, 104, 1996, 510 – 541) we investigate a dynamic version of the model in which 
agents’ decision rules are updated using genetic algorithms. Our main interest is in whether the 
equilibrium dynamics resulting from this learning process helps to explain the main stylized facts of 
free-floating exchange rates (unit roots in levels together with fat tails in returns and volatility 
clustering). Our time series analysis of simulated data indicates that for particular parameterizations, 
the characteristics of the exchange rate dynamics are, in fact, very similar to those of empirical data. 
The similarity appears to be quite insensitive with respect to some of the ingredients of the GA 
algorithm (i.e. utility-based versus rank-based or tournament selection,  binary or real coding). 
However, appearance or not of realistic time series characteristics depends crucially on the mutation 
probability (which should be low) and the number of agents (not more than about 1000). With a 
larger population, this collective learning dynamics looses its realistic appearance and instead exhibits 
regular periodic oscillations of the agents’ choice variables. 
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Foreign exchange markets as well as other financial markets are characterized by a number of 
striking ubiquitous time series features. Most prominently, (log) exchange rates seem to be non-
stationary while their first differences are stationary. More precisely, unit-root tests are typically 
unable to reject the  null hypothesis of a first-order autoregressive process with a coefficient equal to 
unity. This finding squares with the well-known result of Meese and Rogoff (1983) that random walk 
forecasts produce a lower mean-squared error in out-of-sample prediction than reduced-form 
structural models of macroeconomic fundamentals. It has been argued that these findings can be 
explained by speculative efficiency of foreign exchange markets, which simply means one interprets 
the foreign exchange market as an informationally efficient market in the sense of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis. 
 
While from this perspective the unit-root property may not be viewed as a conundrum, other well-
known features have defied straightforward explanations until recently. The most pervasive ones are 
the fat-tail property of relative price changes and the clustering of volatility in these time series. 
Traces of these features are easily recognizable in all records of high-frequency data (probably up to 
weekly frequency) of foreign exchange markets (to our knowledge, without any known exception). 
The fat-tail property implies that the unconditional distribution of daily returns (as well as those of 
higher and somewhat lower frequency) has more probability mass in the tails and the center than the 
standard Normal distribution. This also means that extreme changes occur more often than would be 
expected under the assumption of Normality of relative daily price changes. Volatility clustering 
means that periods of quiescence and turbulence tend to cluster together. Hence, the volatility 
(conditional variance) of exchange rate changes is not homogeneous over time, but is itself subject to 
temporal variation. 
 
Explanations of these stylized facts have been elusive until very recently. Perhaps, the silence of 
economic theory on this issue is not too surprising given that the above regularities are features of 
time series as a whole and, hence, could only be explained by dynamic models of the evolution of 
the trading process in the pertinent market. From the viewpoint of informational efficiency, the 
characteristics of returns would, of course, have to be explained by similar characteristics of the 
news arrival process, but due to the unobservability of the later, this hypothesis can hardly be 
subjected to econometric scrutiny. As an alternative, some authors have recently argued that fat tails 
and clustered volatility can be obtained as a result of interactions of heterogeneous economic agents. 
Examples of this emergent literature include Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000), Chen, Lux and 
Marchesi (2001), Kirman and Teyssiere (2001), Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2000), Chiarella and 
He (2001), Iori (2002) and Bornholdt (2001). Lux and Marchesi, Gaunersdorfer and Hommes, and 
Chiarella and He have models of fundamentalist - chartist interaction in financial markets which give   3
rise to realistic behavior of the resulting time series (in terms of the above stylized facts). In Lux and 
Marchesi and Gaunersdorfer and Hommes, the authors try to provide some hints of general 
mechanisms that could generate these time series properties irrespective of the details of their 
exemplary models. In the former case, it is a critical behavior of the dynamics in the vicinity of a 
continuum of equilibria with an indeterminate composition of the population in terms of strategies 
pursued by individuals. Gaunersdorfer and Hommes get similar dynamics from a model with co-
existing attractors in which noise leads to switches between different states. Still different mechanisms 
prevail in Iori (2002) and Bornholdt (2001) who use lattice-based structures for modeling the 
interactions among traders. Interestingly, a recent paper by Arifovic and Gencay (2000) on an 
artificial currency market with genetic learning of strategies also suggests emergence of realistic 
features of the resulting exchange rate dynamics (cf. Fig. 1).  However, they do not provide a 
detailed analysis concerning the above properties. One of the aims of this paper is to fill this gap. In 
particular, we will try to quantitatively assess the degree of fat tailedness and volatility clustering this 
model generates. We are also interested in the sensitivity of these quantitative measures with respect 
to key parameters of the model. To get an impression of the sensitivity with respect to parameter 
variations, we will try to figure out how the time series properties depend on the genetic algorithm 
parameter and the number of agents populating the market (as will probably become clear in the 
presentation of the model, the values of the few economic variables of the model are of lesser 
importance in this respect). We then relate our findings to those obtained for other models of artificial 
financial markets and try to provide an explanation for the crucial importance of the number of 
individuals for the qualitative outcome of the model.  
 
Our analysis proceeds in the following steps: sec. 2 will introduce the underlying model of the 
foreign exchange market, the well-known Kareken-Wallace two-country overlapping generations 
model. Sec. 3 gives details on the genetic algorithms which we apply to model the learning of our 
agents. In sec. 4, we review the statistics used for assessing how realistic the model’s output is. Sec. 
5 presents the results of extensive Monte Carlo work, and sec. 6 tries to provide an explanation for 
the surprising behavior we find in the case of a very large population. Sec. 7 concludes. 
 
Fig. 1 about here 
 
2. The Kareken and Wallace OLG Economy 
  
As a version of the Kareken and Wallace (1981) two country model, the underlying economic 
structure is extremely simple: at each date t, one-half of the entire population is replaced by a new 
generation (the young), while the remaining members are in the second and final period of their lives 
(the old) and will be replaced in the next period by another young generation. Each agent is endowed 
with w 1 units of a homogeneous good in its first period and with w 2 units in the second period of its   4
live. There is neither production nor inheritance of goods. Intertemporal consumption smoothing can 
be achieved via money holdings of currency of the home and foreign country.  
 
With identical preferences of all agents, U(ci(t), c i(t+1)), their consumption plans and money 
demand are derived from 
 
(1)     max   U(ci(t), ci(t+1))  
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With ci(t), m i,1(t) and m i,2(t): consumption and money holdings of agent i (i=1,..., N) at time t, w1 
and w 2 the homogeneous endowment levels, and p1(t) and p2(t) the price levels in both countries at 
time t. Note that with this setup, it even does not matter, how many of the agents are citizens of 
countries 1 or 2 as their economic decisions are not affected by their geographic location. 
 
Assuming that nominal money supply H1 and H2, is constant, and denoting by si(t) overall ‘savings’ 
of individual i, the price levels at time t are determined by: 
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The exchange rate, e(t), between both countries is, then, obtained as e(t) =  .
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It is straightforward to spell out some results on possible equilibria (steady states) of this model. 
Using c i(t) and f i(t) as choice variables of our agents, it is immediately obvious that a stationary 
solution requires the rates of returns on both currencies to be equal, i.e.  .
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Simple inspection shows that such a steady state has the following properties: 
 
(1) the exchange rate is constant over time: e(t+1) = e(t) = e*. However, the level of the 
exchange rate in equilibrium, e*, is indeterminate and may be any value in the half-line, e* ˛ (0,¥).   5
(2) Given the equality of returns form both currencies, the equilibrium composition of each 
agent’s portfolio is indeterminate as well and fi*, therefore, might assume any admissible value f i* 
˛ [0,1]. Note that we do not have to assume identical portfolio choices of the agents in 
equilibrium. Any constant distribution of the f i*’s over generations would be consistent with 
constant rates of returns and a constant exchange rate. We could even allow for certain changes of 
the distribution of the f i*s: equilibrium would still prevail as long as the mean value of their 
distributions remains the same over time. 
(3) Since the rates of returns from both assets are identical in equilibrium, optimal consumption 
plans are independent from the portfolio composition. With a well-behaved utility function, utility 
maximizing choice ci* will typically be unique and identical for all individuals with the same utility 
function and endowment structure. For example, with utility functions U i = c i(t) c i(t+1) and 
constant money supply in both countries, rates of return would be equal to one and ci* would be 
0.5(w1 + w2) for all individuals.  
 
The non-uniqueness of the equilibrium exchange rate in this type of model derives from the absence 
of typical macroeconomic fundamentals of monetary models. In view of the evidence on unit-roots in 
empirical data, this feature has been emphasized as an advantage of their model by Kareken and 
Wallace One could indeed imagine that added random fluctuations could easily produce a unit-root 
dynamics, since random disturbances could lead to a random motion of the exchange rate along the 
continuum of possible equilibria (every time, the equilibrium is distorted by random shocks, the 
exchange rate would settle at a new equilibrium). However, non-uniqueness of equilibria also raises 
the questions of selection of equilibria and coordination of agents. These questions have been taken 
up first by Sargent (1993) who modeled learning via stochastic approximation algorithms. Later on 
Arifovic (1996) considered GA learning in the Kareken–Wallace framework. Looking at the 
evolution of returns instead of the level of the exchange rate Arifovic and Gencay (2000)  recovered 
realistic features in the continuing fluctuations of the resulting dynamics. 
 
 
3. Genetic Algorithm Learning 
 
Genetic algorithms have been introduced by Holland (1975) as a stochastic search algorithm for 
numerical optimization. This approach uses operations similar to genetic processes of biological 
organisms to develop better solutions of an optimization problem from an existing ‘population’ of 
randomly initiated candidate solutions. Typically, the proposed solutions have been encoded in 
strings (chromosomes) using a binary alphabet (see Dawid, 1999 for a general introduction). This is 
also the structure of the GAs applied in Arifovic and Gencay (2000). Each individual’s decisions are 
encoded in a binary string of length l=30, whose first twenty e lements encode first-period 
consumption and whose remaining ten entries encode the fraction of currency one in his portfolio.
1 
                                                                 
1 Choosing l = 30 with substrings of twenty and ten bits, respectively, we closely  followed Arifovic (1996) and   6
With ai,t
k denoting the value at the k-th position of the string (0 or 1), the binary string is translated 
into a real-valued number in the following way: 
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where K1 and K2 are normalizing constants to restrict the possible real values to a predetermined 
admissible interval.  
 
In order to have fi(t) ˛ [0,1], K 2 is set equal to K2 = 2
10 – 1, while c i(t) should be within the 
interval [0,w1] to guarantee viable consumption plans. With w 1 = 10 in Arifovic and Gencay’s 






The overlapping generations structure of the model implies an overlapping genetic algorithms 
structure of the evolutionary process. After each period, half of the population members have 
completed their life cycle. With the resulting consumption in their old age their achieved fitness 
(utility) can be determined and used for the genetic creation of a new pool of agents entering the 
economy as the young generation of the following period. 
 
The genetic operations applied in this step are the following: 
 
(1) Reproduction: from the pool of old individuals, copies are selected (with replacement) with 








Other algorithms for reproduction could be chosen as well: proposals in the GA literature include 
rank-based reproduction in which only the rank (not the absolute fitness) determines the probability 
of reproduction, and tournament selection, in which one repeatedly draws n1 (say 5) individuals from 
the pool and accepts the n 2 < n 1 (say 2) with highest utility among them for the new generation. 
Below we report only results for fitness-based reproduction. Experiments with rank-based and 
tournament selection have also been carried out yielding almost identical results. 
(2) Crossover: when the pool of potential  new members of a generation is complete, genetic 
material is exchanged between them. The simplest way is randomly selecting a pair of parent strings 
and swapping genetic material (bits) between both chromosomes. Here, we again follow the 
algorithm used by Arifivic and Gencay in selecting randomly an integer in the range of [1,29] and 
constructing offspring by combining the genetic material from the left of this position from parent one 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Arifovic and Gencay (2000). However, like with most other details of the genetic algorithm implementation, 
variation of these numbers did not change the qualitative characteristics of the dynamics.   7
with that from the right-hand part of parent two and vice versa. Note that the cross-over operation 
is carried out with a certain probability pcross only, while with probability 1-pcross the offspring are 
unchanged copies of their parents. Alternative implementations of the crossover operator include 
two-point crossover (exchange of material in an interval between two randomly chosen bits) and 
uniform cross-over (the two offsprings are random recombinations of their parents’ bits). Again, the 
whole chain of our findings reported below seems to be robust with respect to the choice of the 
particular cross-over operator. 
(3) Mutation simply means that each position within a string is altered with a certain probability 
pmut to the other value of the binary alphabet. 
(4) Finally, the election operator tests newly generated offspring before letting them enter the 
population. In order to avoid a decrease of the fitness of the overall population due to the genetic 
alteration of strategies, only those among the offspring are accepted which are at least as fit as one of 
their parents. If after crossover and mutation offspring have lower fitness, exact copies of their 
parents are placed into the new generation. 
 
Beside these traditional binary coded GAs, we also experimented with real coded GAs in the 
present framework. A real coded GA simply uses a real representation of the choice variables. In 
our case, a real-coded chromosome would, therefore, consist of a pair {ci(t), fi(t)}. 
 
Mutatis mutandis, similar genetic operations can be defined for this variant (cf. Herrera et al., 
1998, for an overview  on real-coded GAs). First, reproduction occurs in the same way as with 
binary GAs. As for cross-over, a number of alternative mechanisms have been proposed in the 
literature. Here, we follow Eshelman and Shaffer (1993) in picking new choice variables which are 
uniformly and independently drawn from an interval covering the pertinent values of the parents’ 
chromosome. To illustrate let  )} t ( c ), t ( c max{ c B A = ,  )} t ( c ), t ( c min{ c B A = , and  c c dc - =  
with cA(t) and cB(t) consumption choices of parents i = A, B. Then, the first-period consumption of 
offsprings is determined by uniform random draws from [c - g d c,  c  + gdc] . A similar operation 
yields the new portfolio fractions of the offsprings. Note that g is a predetermined value that allows 
for some ‘experimentation’ within regions not covered by the genetic material of the parents. Its role 
is also to compensate for the drift towards the mean of the admissible strategy space from a 
crossover operator with g = 0. Herrera et al. (1998) show that this algorithm has better performance 
on some test problems than many alternatives. Mutation with real variables is done by using Normal 
random variables with mean zero and small variance to slightly change the prevailing choice variables. 
Election, finally, occurs in the same way as with binary coding.
2 
                                                                 
2 On a first view, the real coded GAs seem to be a much more natural way to deal with any real-valued problem 
than binary GAs. However, good reasons are given in the literature to actually prefer binary coding in many 
applications. In particular, although at first view GAs seem to process only the particular chromosomes within the 
population, they actually allow for a parallel processing of many different parts of alternative solutions. This 
might be sensed by considering the following example: the binary coded values for 0 and 4, i.e. 000 and 100, have 
two – thirds of their genetic material in common, so that it is ‘easy’ for the genetic operations to switch from one   8
 
 
4. Empirical Benchmarks 
 
To see whether our foreign exchange market populated by genetically learning overlapping 
generations has realistic time series properties we use a battery of statistical tests. 
 
(i)  Unit root tests: a realistic market should yield a exchange rate dynamics which appears to be 
close to a random walk. We, therefore, perform typical tests for the presence of a unit root in our 
synthetic time series using the standard Dickey Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) 
tests. The underlying data are logs of the exchange rate since from the symmetric construction of the 
Kareken-Wallace model we would also expect symmetry of relative changes. For the ADF test, we 
also included the first three differences as independent variables.  
(ii) Fat-tail property: the recent econometric literature has provided a very sharp characterization 
of this feature. In particular, it could be shown that the decline of the probability mass in the tails 
follows a power-law with a coefficient that is astonishingly uniform across markets. This amounts to 
large returns (rt) following a relationship: 
a - > x ~ ) x r .( ob Pr t  with the so-called ‘tail index’ a 
hovering within the interval between 2 and 5. Estimation of a using conditional maximum likelihood is 
straightforward, and a wealth of supporting evidence can be found in De Vries (1994) and 
Dacorogna  et al. (2001). As a typical example, estimation of the tail index for the DM/U.S.$ 
exchange rate with daily data ranging from 1974 to 1998 yields an estimate a = 3.69 (95% 
confidence interval: 3.38 to 4.10) when using the five percent largest absolute returns. The review by 
De Vries and the monograph by Dacorogna et al. give similar statistics for other currencies. 
(iii)  Volatility clustering: this feature can be characterized by autoregressive dependence in 
various measures of volatility. Here we also have a very precise and uniform picture from almost all 
available data sets. In particular, it has been found that the dependence in volatility measures like 
squared or absolute returns extends over very long time horizons and exhibits a hyperbolic decay of 
the autocovariance function:  k -
D - Dt ~ ] x x [ E t t t  with x t: squared or absolute returns. This slow 
decay is in contrast to fast (exponential) decline and is also denoted as long-term dependence. Like 
with the fat-tail property, quantitative measurements of the decay parameter k give very uniform 
results across markets. As a benchmark for our later analysis of simulated data, we give estimates 
from the frequently used periodogram regression technique due to Geweke and Porter-Hudak 
(1983). These authors device a method for estimation the parameter of fractional differentiation, 
denoted d in the following, which is related to k by: k = 1 - 2d. An estimate of d significantly larger 
than 0 would show evidence for the long-memory property. Inability of rejection of d = 0 would 
indicate absence of long-term dependence. For the sake of illustration, daily DM/$ data yield (95% 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
to the other. With real-coded GAs, 0 and 4 have nothing in common and a large succession of crossovers and 
mutations is needed to move from one to the other.   9
confidence intervals in brackets): raw returns: d = 0.07 (-0.09, 0.23); squared returns: d = 0.24 
(0.08, 0.40), absolute returns: 0.29 (0.13, 0.45). Again, a glance at, for example, Dacorogna et al. 
shows that these figures are quite representative for foreign exchange data (as well as for financial 
data in general). The inability of rejection of d = 0 for raw returns, of course, squares well with the 
unit-root property of log exchange rates. The finding of a higher level of persistence in absolute 
returns rather than squared returns is also quite universal and has by itself motivated a large body of 
recent econometric literature. 
 
 
5. Pseudo-Empirical Results 
 
Tables 1 to 6 present the results of a large number of experiments with various versions of our 
artificial economy. Tables 1 to 3 show results for binary coded GAs, while tables 4 to 6 are 
concerned with simulations using real coded GAs.  
 
Our starting point was the scenario underlying the simulations by Arifovic and Gencay (2000). The 
particular Kareken-Wallace economy in this paper had the following properties: all individuals share 
a common utility function U i = ci(t) ci(t+1), endowments are w 1 = 10, w 2 = 4, and nominal money 
supplies are H 1 = 3000, H 2 = 3600. It can immediately be seen that this leads to a steady state 
consumption level of c* = c(t) = c(t+1) = 7 and steady-state savings s* = s(t) = s(t+1) = 3. Prima 
facie, it appears unlikely that changes in these economic variables should yield greatly different 
results (as long as endowments would lead to positive savings). Experimentation with different 
parameters and alternative utility functions (e.g., logarithmic utility) confirmed this conjecture. 
 
In fact, our interest here is more (i) in the sensitivity with respect to the details of the learning 
dynamics, and (ii) the influence of the number of agents. Our interest in the effects of the size of the 
market derives from some puzzling earlier findings. Namely, a number of studies have revealed that 
existing multi-agent models of financial markets loose their realistic time series properties when 
increasing the number of agents (Egenter et al., 1999; Yeh, 2001, Challet and Marsili, 2002). Since 
published work on artificial markets with GA learning has used only a very limited number of agents, 
typically below 100, it seems worthwhile to explore the behavior of larger economies. 
 
Let us start with the effects of varying the GA’s parameter settings. From the two parameters of 
the binary genetic operations, pmut and pcross, we found the first to be the more interesting one in that 
variation of pcross only led to slight variations of the statistical properties. In a first set of experiments 
we, therefore, fixed pcross at 0.6 and also fixed the population size at the level used in Arifovic and 
Gencay, N = 60 (i.e., 30 individuals in each generation). In order to see the effects of variation of 
pmut, we varied this parameter from 0.005 to 0.05 (with increments of 0.005) and applied the 
statistical analyses outlined above to 100 samples each containing 2,000 data points (a length of the   10
data series comparable to many empirical records). The 100 samples are taken as non-overlapping 
windows from a simulation continuing over 205,000 periods where the first 5,000 data points have 
been discarded to account for transient behavior. Minimum, median and maximum of the tail index 
estimates (for tail sizes of 2,5%, 5% and 10% of the data) are shown in Table 1, while the minimum, 
median and maximum of the estimates of d are given in the Table 2. Table 3, finally gives the median 
and range of estimates of the autoregressive parameter from the Dickey-Fuller and Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test together with the frequencies of one-sided (in brackets: two-sided) rejection of 
the unit-root null under a 95% confidence level. Results are quite homogeneous with respect to our 
three stylized facts in so far as the behavior is most realistic for small values of pmut around 0.05 to 
0.01. In this region we have a high percentage of non-rejection of a unit root in log exchange rates 
(at least for the ADF test which corrects for short-run dynamics) together with median values of d 
close to their empirical counterparts. The median tail index estimates might appear somewhat too 
small, but are still within the range observed with empirical data. Fig. 1 illustrates that returns 
obtained with this setting of the GA parameters indeed do look very realistic and may be hard to 
distinguish from real-life records with the naked eye (at least, after, proper adjustment of the scale of 
the fluctuations). However, when increasing pmut beyond 0.02, rejection of a unit root in favour of a 
root smaller than unity occurs in all cases, the fractional differencing parameter for raw returns 
becomes negative (which is also a signature of mean reversion), and the temporal dependence in 
squared and absolute returns declines. Finally, the tail index becomes somewhat too high. 
 
Tables 1 to 3 about here 
 
In our second set of experiments, we then varied N keeping the mutation probability at the value 
0.01. Since the simulations become more time-consuming with increasing N, we restricted our 
investigation to 25 samples (i.e. a time series of overall length of 55,000 time steps for each 
parameter set). Here the changes are even more dramatic. When moving from small (N = 20) to 
very large markets (N = 10,000), we get an even larger drop of the autoregressive coefficient in the 
unit-root tests, highly negative d’s for raw returns and a total fading out of volatility clustering (the d’s 
of squared and absolute returns approaching zero). The tail index decreases and has median values 
below 2 for the maximum size of the market (N = 10,000). 
 
Before turning to explanations, let us look at the pertinent results for real-coded GA’s for which we 
also varied both the set-up of the mutation operator and the number of agents (Tables 4 to 6). Again, 
the parameters of the crossover operator are kept constant (uniform crossover as described in s. 3 
with a parameter g = 0.2 was used). The mutation operator now has two parameters, the probability 
of its activation pmut and the variance of the Normal mutations, smut. 
 
The upper and middle part of Tables 4 to 6 exhibit the effects of systematic variation of pmut and 
smut. Again, 100 samples of 2,000 data points each have been used. Since markets with real-coded   11
GA’s need less computation time, we were able to use 100 subsamples when assessing the effects of 
market size and could also use a somewhat larger maximum size of N = 20,000. 
 
In broad harmony with the binary-coded case, realistic properties are obtained with small mutation 
probability and small variance of mutation. Nevertheless, certain differences are observed between 
the binary and real-coded cases: in particular, the DF and ADF tests are still unable to reject the unit 
root hypothesis in the majority of cases even with a relatively large mutation rate and a large number 
of traders. On the other hand, mean reverting tendencies are clearly observable in the estimates of 
the fractional differencing parameter for raw returns in these cases. It might be that the evolution of 
the system is simply very slow so that in many periods the slight variations in the exchange rate go 
through as a unit root process. In contrast to the binary case, in the real-coded one the two-sided 
test often yields more rejections than the one-sided test. The additional right-hand rejections may be 
related to the sudden bursts of activity visible in the upper part of Fig. 3. Overall, the much higher 
rate of rejection of the unit root hypothesis in the binary case might be due to the higher degree of 
stochasticity inherited from thirty instances of mutation (for every bit) instead of two instances only in 
the real-coded case. Some reflection, in fact, reveals that the values of the mutation probabilities can 
not be directly compared between the binary coded and real coded GAs. For example, a pmut = 
0.033 (per bit) for binary coded GAs implies that with chromosomes of thirty bits, almost every 
individual will undergo some mutation of its genetic material. This amounts to a much higher mutation 
rate within the population with p mut = 0.01 in the binary case than with 0.05 for real coded bits. 
Except for non-rejection of the unit root hypothesis,  the pattern of results is, in fact, almost the same 
as with binary GAs when increasing N. looking at the resulting time series, we find in both the real-
coded and binary coded case a tendency towards persistent and very regular cycles when increasing 
the number of agents (cf. Figs. 3 and 4). 
 
Tables 4 to 6 about here 
 
 
Besides this similarity in the results from both GA variants (and a number of alternative 
implementations of various operators) our experiments also show that we do not need all of the 
typical elements of the GA to arrive at these results. Essentially, the structure of the artificial economy 
remains unchanged if we dispense with both the selection and crossover operators. Mutation and 
election alone are capable of producing these patterns, but they are also crucial for their emergence 
(although selection and crossover tend to speed up convergence to regular oscillations). 
 
 
6.  Interpretation of Results 
 
What is the reason for this fading out of realistic time series properties with increasing mutation   12
probability and increasing number of agents? It is probably not too difficult to answer the first part of 
the question: A high mutation probability introduces a certain tendency of mean-revision of the choice 
parameters which i s reflected in similar mean reversion of the exchange rate. For the sake of 
illustration, imagine a model with a mutation probability equal to 1 in the case of binary coded GAs 
(corresponding to a pmut = 1 together with a high variance of mutation in the real coded case). This 
would lead to a stationary random distribution of agent’s strategies. All deviations from the average 
would be corrected by the new random choice of the population in the next period and, hence, one 
gets a tendency of return to the mean values of the distribution of ci(t) and fi(t). Since these choice 
variables determine prices and the exchange rate, mean-reversion would also carry over to these 
variables as well. The higher the mutation rate, the higher the influence of this tendency. Higher pmut, 
therefore, leads to less persistence in exchange rates so that the exchange rate dynamics becomes 
stationary and unit roots can be rejected. This suspected change in the appearance of the time series 
is already well recognizable when comparing binary coded GAs with p mut = 0.01 and 0.05, 
respectively (cf. Fig. 2). While the former series (or parts of it) might be accepted as a random walk 
by the DF and ADF tests, the second surely will not. As a conclusion, we infer from these 
considerations that random experimentation with strategies has to be limited in order to get realistic 
appearance of the time series. 
 
Fig. 2 about here 
 
As to the number of agents, a glance at the time series resulting with different sizes of the market 
reveals some perplexing patterns (Figs. 3 and 4). What looks extremely unsystematic with a small 
market (N = 200), becomes much more regular when the market becomes lager and eventually 
evolves into an almost perfectly regular oscillatory motion of some ‘macroscopic’ variables (in 
particular, the exchange rate and the average fraction of domestic currency in the portfolio).
3 On a 
close inspection, the short spikes in the exchange rate fluctuations in Fig. 3 are very similar to one 
half-cycle in Fig. 4. Such a regular pattern is puzzling at first view as it is the result of the evolving 
decisions of a very large ensemble of autonomous artificial agents. Keeping in mind that the quantity 
displayed in the middle part of Figs. 3 and 4 is a population average what these oscillations show is 
a systematic shift of the whole distribution of this variable within an heterogeneous ensemble of 
agents. To our knowledge nothing of a similar type of self-organizing patterns is known in multi-agent 
systems with GA learning in economics or other fields. A certain clue to the underlying mechanisms 
can be obtained through analysis of what happens in the case of a large economy (i.e., with the 
number of agents going to infinity). Noting that GAs are an adaptive adjustment scheme that drives 
the actual average behavior of the population towards the momentary optimum of the choice 
variables, the large economy case might be described via the resulting deterministic mean value 
                                                                 
3 We have chosen a higher mutation probability compared to our benchmark case in Fig. 4 since it both leads to a 
decrease of the amplitude of the oscillations and provides faster convergence to almost perfectly regular patterns. 
However, the trend to  emerging regular oscillations is also clearly visible in other simulations with either real-
coded or binary GAs.   13
dynamics of the choice variables. Unfortunately, the present dynamics is too complicated to derive 
explicit dynamics laws for the large economy limit.
4 However, some heuristic considerations will 
reveal most of the important elements of our dynamics.  
 
Fig. 3 about here 
 
As an adaptive adjustment scheme, the genetic algorithm has at its intrinsic benchmark those values 
ci*(t) and fi*(t) which would have been optimal choices for the population at time t which inherits its 
genetic material to the generation born at time t+2.  
 
It is easy to see that for our utility function Ui = ci(t) ci(t+1) optimal behavior of individual i at time t 
would have been: 
 
(4.a)   )
) 1 t ( p
) t ( p
)) t ( f 1 (
) 1 t ( p
) t ( p





























ate min er det in
1
) t ( f
*
i      if    
) 1 t ( p
) t ( p
) 1 t ( p












Via prices at period t+1, the optimal behavior of generation t also depends on the decisions of the 
next generation. The election operator, in fact, guarantees that the resulting new individuals accepted 
after selection, crossover and mutation are at least as good as their parents. For the portfolio 
component, this clearly implies  )] t ( f ), t ( f [ ) 2 t ( f *
i i i ˛ +  while consumption might also overshoot its 
target, ci*(t) as long as the resulting new parameter set provides at least the utility level enjoyed by 
the parent individuals. Since in any out-of-equilibrium situation, the goal value for the fraction of 
domestic assets will be the same, 0 or 1, for all members of the population, in the large economy 
limit, the motion of the mean value  ) t ( f  will follow a deterministic path towards these values as long 
as the pay-off differential from holding domestic or foreign currency does not change. 
 
Fig. 4 about here 
 
To see the source of the regular fluctuations, consider a stationary situation with homogenous 
choice variables c i(t) = c i(t-1) = c* and f i(t) = f i(t-1) = f 0, where f 0 might be any admissible value 
between 0 and 1. Arifovic (1996) has already emphasized that any such equilibrium of this GA 
economy is evolutionary unstable since any local disturbance (mutation) will be magnified by the 
                                                                 
4 Available analytical approaches to genetic algorithm dynamics consider simpler examples and are not applicable 
to the present model (e.g., Prügel-Benett, 1994, or Srinivar and Patnaik, 1996).   14
ensuing adjustments of the remaining members of the population. For the sake of the argument, 
assume that only one individual undergoes a mutation when the generation t+1 emerges from the 
genetic operations on generation t-1. Assume furthermore that this mutation amounts to an increase 
of the fraction of domestic money in the portfolio of this agent, while its consumption remains 
unchanged at the initial equilibrium level. Since this new strategy will have the same utility as its 
parents (because returns from holding either currency are initially identical), the election operator will 
allow this offspring to replace one of its parents. However, the presence of this mutant suffices to 
change the structure of returns for agents of generation t: instead of equal returns, they experience a 
higher pay-off from holding domestic money: 
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Although the differential might be very small, it suffices to make f* = 1 the dominant strategy. 
Hence, the random change from generation t-1 to generation t+1 induces a systematic shift into the 
same direction when generation t inherits its genetic material to generation t+2. Does it also lead to 
changes in the consumption behavior of generation t+2? Changes in the momentary optimal 
consumption level occur if the denominator in eq. (4.a) deviates from one. With consumption still 
equal to its steady state level at generations t and t+1, this denominator  amounts to 
) t ( f 1
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. Given our assumption,  ) t ( f ) 1 t ( f > + , it is easy to see that the 
denominator is > (<) 1 for individuals with f i(t) > (<) ) t ( f . It would, therefore, be optimal for the 
former to reduce first-period consumption, while the later would find it advantageous to increase it. 
However, since we have also assumed that all individuals share the same choice variable fi(t) = f0 = 
) t ( f  at time t, the former consumption level c* would still be optimal for all generation t members as 
long as their portfolio choice remains unaffected by the genetic operations, so that isolated changes 
of ci(t) would not survive the election operator test. Note that these considerations apply only in the 
case of isolated genetic changes of either f i(t) or ci(t). Often both variables will be affected by the 
genetic processes. To see more generally, what kind of arbitrary combined genetic changes would 
survive in our scenario, we can take stock of the traditional concept of indifference curves. 
Accepting only offspring who are at least as fit as their parents, the election operator only allows 
those to enter the population whose choice variables positions them on the same indifference curve 
like their parents or a higher indifference curve. Consider the utility obtained by parent individual i: 
 
(6)     )) t ( )) t ( c w ( w ( ) t ( c ) t ( U i 1 , i 1 2 1 , i i r ￿ - + ￿ = ,  with  ) t ( R )) t ( f 1 ( ) t ( R ) t ( f ) t ( 2 i 1 i i ￿ - + ￿ = r . 
 
The slope of an indifference curve is given by: 
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For R1(t) > R2(t) this gives: 
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This yields the parabolic shape of the indifference curves exhibited in Fig. 5. In the case of R1(t) < 
R2(t), the inequalities in eq. (8) are reversed and the indifference curve parabolas have the opposite 
orientation. In the present case, R1(t) > R 2(t), it can be inferred from eq. (7), that higher utility can 
only be achieved if a higher fraction of domestic assets is chosen. If, however, this necessary 
condition for an improvement is met, a certain range of higher or lower consumption levels would be 
accepted by the election operator. As can be seen from Fig. 5, in the above situation in which 
) 1 t ( f +  slightly exceeds  ) t ( f , the spectrum of utility improving changes is slightly asymmetric with 
respect to consumption. Assuming that all initial consumption levels are close to c*, the pay-offs can 
be reduced to: 
) t ( f 1
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= . According to the arguments given above, 
individuals with a below (above) average fraction of domestic money would, then,  
have ) w w ( 5 . 0 * c ) ( )) t ( f ( * c 2 1 i + = < > . The expected direction of combined changes of ci and f i 
would, therefore, depend on the individual’s position within the distribution of the fi’s. For roughly 
half of the population on average somewhat higher consumption l evels would pass the election 
operator, while for the other half of its members, the genetic operations would slightly favor a 
reduction in consumption. With a symmetric distribution of the f i’s, the expected macroscopic effect 
of induced changes of ci would be close to zero. With an asymmetric distribution, skewness would 
somewhat favor one or the other direction of changes, but since this is a third-order effect, one might 
expect it to be negligible. This conjecture is supported by our simulations which show no clear trend 
in the development of c i(t) over time. What can be observed, however, is that an increase of the 
number of agents leads to a reduction of the size of fluctuations of ci(t), cf. Figs. 3 and 4. 
 
With only small and rather unsystematic changes of c i(t), the systematic changes of the portfolio 
composition will dominate the dynamics. The attraction towards the extreme solutions will, then, be 
self-reinforcing leading to an ever increasing fraction of domestic assets in the upward part of the 
cycle. Since every new round of genetic breeding of a new cohort starts at a higher average level of fi 
compared to the previous period, the deterministic limit of the stochastic dynamics will also lead to a 
higher new average value two periods later compared to the period before. In the infinite population 
limit, this trend will continue until the entire population will have converged to f i(t) = 1. Although in 
this situation, all inherent tendencies of genetic changes come to a halt, the first mutation of an 
individual leading to an f i < 1 will destabilize this stationary state again and generate a systematic   16
downward trend which over time leads to a convergence of the whole population to f i(t) = 0. Here 
again, any mutation will exert a destabilizing tendency commencing the upward part of the cycle… 
and so on ad infinitum. Note that this endlessly repeating cycle should also somehow exist as a 
tendency in the finite population case (since what we observe in the large population case should 
correspond to the pure mean value dynamics). Of course, the cyclical development shown in Fig. 4 
would not be consistent with a unit root in log exchange rates (it is a clearly mean reverting process) 
and volatility clustering. In an sense, with a large population, the inherent randomness of the artificial 
economy gets lost and the measurable macroeconomic observables (pi(t), e(t)) become deterministic 
quantities. 
 
However, at least for very small populations, this inherent structure of the combined genetic and 
economic process seems to be entirely concealed by the random elements in the genetic processes 
on the level of the individual. In fact, the systematic tendencies worked out above will be subject to 
more random distortions with a small population size. An upward or downward tendency will be 
inverted as soon as the portfolio fraction of a new generation is not higher (lower) than that of the 
preceding one. It is the more likely that this random event happens the smaller the size of the 
population is. The apparently realistic time series characteristics result from situations where this 
happens with a very high probability within a few time steps. This explains why these more irregular 
dynamics with recurrent bursts of activity are only observed within a certain range of small numbers 
of agents. 
 
We end our attempts at providing intuitive explanations of the evolutionary dynamics of our model 
with some remarks on the dynamics of second moments. As can be seen from Fig. 4, even the 
standard deviations of our choice variables exhibit predictable systematic patterns over the cycle. In 
particular, both the standard deviation of first-period consumption and  the standard deviation of the 
fraction of domestic assets increase when one of the corner equilibria becomes unstable, remains 
relatively high during most of the motion to the opposite end of the parameter space and converges 
to zero when this new stationary solution is eventually approached. Note that this also implies that 
despite the near constancy of the mean value of c i(t), the dynamics is often characterized by a 
relatively wide range of individual choices. What happens is that after destabilization of an 
equilibrium, a broad range of choices of ci(t) and fi(t) gives higher utility (as can be inferred from the 
indifference curves in Fig. 5). Hence, many different types of mutations will be allowed to enter the 
population. The distribution of the choice variables spreads out and in the following, the whole 
population moves like a swarm from the left-hand side of the space of choice variables to its upper 
right-hand end (cf. Fig. 6). When the portfolio choices converge to a homogeneous situation fi(t) =1 
again, higher indifference curves can only be reached with consumption levels close to the steady 
state level c*. This leads to a decrease of the bandwidth of first-period consumption levels in the 
population. Eventually, the variability with respect to both choice variables shrinks to zero. Once all 
individuals are close to the utility-maximizing steady state levels (fi(t) = 1, c i(t) = c*), a small   17
destabilizing mutation will lead to a sudden spread of the distribution of strategies and will set into 
motion a left-ward dynamics of the whole swarm of individuals. 
 
Figs. 5 and 6 about here 
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
Elaborating on the GA version of the Kareken-Wallace model introduced by Arifovic (1996) and 
Arifovic/Gencay (2000), we have analyzed both the potential and the limitations for this type of 
artificial open economy to generate realistic time series properties. As it turns out, the model can 
generate time series which very closely mimic the statistical characteristics of empirical data. The 
mechanism responsible for the emergence of these interesting dynamics seems to be similar to the 
one analyzed within a different context by Lux and Marchesi (1999): the model has a continuum of 
equilibria with an indeterminate distribution of strategies among agents (as has been argued above, 
any distribution of the f i would be admissible in equilibrium). With the stochasticity of the genetic 
process, there will always be distortions preventing the system from settling at any particular 
equilibrium. Because of the evolutionary instability of any distribution of strategies these random 
distortions will evoke self-amplifying tendencies which produce large price changes (fat tails) and 
volatility clustering. However, we also find that a small probability of mutation and a small number of 
agents are needed to get this realistic output for the exchange rate. With a large population, the 
destabilizing tendencies are so strong that the crucial choice variable, f i, bounces back and forth 
between the corners of the admissible parameter space.  This applies to both binary and real coded 
GAs. While the requirement of small mutation rates might be considered to be plausible and not too 
restrictive, having to restrict the population size to numbers below, say, N = 1000 is much more 
cumbersome. Real markets (in particular, the world-wide market for foreign exchange), surely have 
more participants so that N < 1000 seems an unrealistic requirement. However, this disappointing 
finding is shared by other multi-agent models (cf. Egenter et al., 1999, Yeh, 2001, Challet and 
Marsili, 2002). Essentially, with high N, a law of large numbers becomes effective even in models 
with a large number of available strategies and the randomness from the interaction between the 
microscopic choice of strategies vanishes. While in certain models, prices converge to fundamental 
values in the large economy limit (Egenter et al., 1999), the absence of fundamentals in the Kareken-
Wallace model appears to be responsible for the oscillations between extreme choices.  
 
How could one overcome these uncomfortable findings and save the ‘nice’ results obtained with 
smaller populations? One possibility would be to allow for more coherence among individuals via 
social sharing of information. Allowing for groups of agents to form, we would get a smaller effective 
number of agents. As an alternative, endogenous development of wealth could lead to some agents 
exerting more influence on the market outcome than others (of course, this feature would be   18
particularly difficult to incorporate into the present simple model). This would presumable also 
change the outcome in a way that differs from the atomistic case analyzed above. Exploring these 
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Table 1: Variation of Tail Index Estimate from Binary Coded GAs 
             
Varying mutation probability, constant population size N= 60 
 
tail size 2.5 %  tail size 5%  tail size 10 % 
pmut  min  median  max  min  median  max  min   median  max 
0.005  1.37  2.82  5.07  1.20  2.16  4.81  1.15  1.92  5.37 
0.010  1.93  3.36  5.06  1.35  2.81  3.81  1.34  2.21  3.06 
0.015  2.16  3.90  5.87  1.76  3.25  4.38  1.60  2.55  3.36 
0.020  1.88  4.14  6.30  2.15  3.51  4.80  2.13  2.83  3.75 
0.025  2.60  4.45  6.87  2.60  3.81  5.47  2.31  3.04  3.72 
0.030  3.25  4.75  7.00  3.24  4.11  5.27  2.79  3.34  3.90 
0.035  2.30  5.15  7.64  2.52  4.25  5.34  2.80  3.46  4.01 
0.040  3.50  5.13  8.38  3.23  4.42  6.64  2.85  3.61  4.40 
0.045  3.50  5.09  7.37  3.48  4.46  6.36  3.04  3.71  4.52 
0.050  3.88  5.20  7.62  3.56  4.53  5.70  3.10  3.76  5.01 
                             
                   
Constant mutation probability pmut = 0.01, varying population size 
 
tail size 2.5 %  tail size 5%  tail size 10 % 
N  min  median  max   min  median  max  min  median  max 
20  1.73  3.29  5.43  1.38  2.64  4.67  1.30  2.26  9.17 
100  2.76  3.77  4.56  2.12  3.17  3.85  2.02  2.49  2.79 
200  2.29  4.19  5.67  2.26  3.54  4.64  2.16  2.68  3.16 
1000  1.87  3.22  5.54  1.86  3.15  4.58  1.85  2.80  3.81 
2000  1.46  2.64  4.70  1.60  2.74  4.17  1.78  2.67  3.74 
4000  1.19  1.94  3.78  1.52  1.92  3.53  1.56  2.20  3.21 
10000  1.44  1.92  3.27  1.28  1.82  3.22  1.35  1.93  2.84 
Note: Table 1 shows estimates of the parameter á from the asymptotic power-law behavior of large returns: 
a - > x ~ ) x r .( ob Pr t . We follow the literature in applying a conditional maximum likelihood estimator 
with a prespecified size of the tail region. To explore the sensitivity of the tail index estimates with respect 
to the choice of the cut-off, we tried tail regions of 2.5%, 5% and 10%. Empirical estimates usually show 
a certain tendency of increasing tail indices when the tail size is reduced. For variation of the mutation 
probability, the minimum, median and maximum over 100 samples with 2,000 data points each are 
shown. For variation of the number of agents, only 25 samples were used due to the increase in 
computation time with increasing number of GA chromosomes. 




Table 2: Variation of Index of Fractional Differentiation from Binary Coded GAs 
 
Varying mutation probability, constant population size N= 60 
raw  squared  absolute returns 
pmut  min  median  max  min  median  max  min   median  max 
0.005  -1.05  -0.03  0.21  -0.23  0.25  0.76  -0.09  0.36  0.81 
0.010  -0.95  -0.05  0.24  -0.04  0.31  0.77  0.15  0.42  0.78 
0.015  -0.61  -0.12  0.29  0.02  0.34  0.81  0.11  0.43  0.88 
0.020  -0.46  -0.17  0.07  -0.11  0.30  0.72  0.04  0.38  0.76 
0.025  -0.57  -0.25  0.03  -0.08  0.25  0.82  -0.09  0.35  0.73 
0.030  -0.58  -0.30  0.07  -0.11  0.23  0.51  -0.07  0.29  0.60 
0.035  -0.66  -0.37  -0.07  -0.10  0.22  0.50  -0.09  0.28  0.47 
0.040  -0.73  -0.43  -0.15  -0.06  0.19  0.44  -0.13  0.22  0.48 
0.045  -0.76  -0.46  -0.14  -0.12  0.19  0.49  -0.07  0.22  0.50 
0.050  -0.84  -0.51  -0.18  -0.13  0.15  0.47  -0.10  0.18  0.52 
                             
                   
Constant mutation probability pmut = 0.01, varying population size 
raw  squared  absolute returns 
N  min  median  max   min  median  max  min  median  max 
20  -0.95  -0.02  0.32  -0.01  0.21  0.80  0.04  0.33  0.90 
100  -0.31  -0.06  0.27  -0.03  0.30  0.79  0.10  0.40  0.73 
200  -0.51  -0.18  0.04  0.09  0.30  0.79  0.20  0.35  0.66 
1000  -0.76  -0.56  -0.32  -0.12  0.13  0.34  0.01  0.16  0.34 
2000  -0.92  -0.61  -0.11  -0.15  0.05  0.27  -0.06  0.07  0.27 
4000  -0.98  -0.48  -0.20  -0.24  0.04  0.33  -0.20  0.07  0.36 
10000  -0.85  -0.40  -0.11  -0.23  0.01  0.13  -0.12  0.04  0.22 
Note: Table 2 shows estimates of the parameter d from the hyperbolic decay of auto-covariances for 
variables with long-term dependence:  1 d 2
t t t t ~ ] x x [ E -
D - D . We estimate d via the log periodogram 
regression technique proposed by Geweke and Porter-Hudak (1983). The underlying data are the same 
as in Table 1. For variation of the mutation probability, the minimum, median and maximum over 100 
samples with 2,000 data points each are shown. For variation of the number of agents, only 25 samples 
were used due to the increase in computation time with increasing number of GA chromosomes. 
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Table 3: Results of Unit-Root Tests for Binary Coded GAs 
                
Varying mutation probability, constant population size N= 60, 100 runs 
 
DF test  Rejections  ADF test  Rejections  
pmut  min  median  max    min   median  max    
0.005  0.15  0.97  1.00  89 (85)  0.30  0.99  1.00  54 (47) 
0.010  0.47  0.97  1.00  97 (95)  0.51  0.98  1.03  64 (59) 
0.015  0.23  0.96  0.98  100 (100)  0.55  0.97  0.99  95 (91) 
0.020  0.11  0.95  0.98  100 (100)  0.42  0.96  0.99  99 (99) 
0.025  0.61  0.93  0.97  100 (100)  0.79  0.95  0.98  100 (100) 
0.030  0.68  0.92  0.96  100 (100)  0.70  0.94  0.98  100 (100) 
0.035  0.20  0.91  0.96  100 (100)  0.44  0.93  0.96  100 (100) 
0.040  0.49  0.91  0.95  100 (100)  0.64  0.93  0.96  100 (100) 
0.045  0.27  0.90  0.95  100 (100)  0.37  0.92  0.95  100 (100) 
0.050  0.15  0.90  0.97  100 (100)  0.33  0.91  1.01  99 (100) 
                          
                 
Constant mutation probability, pmut = 0.01, varying population size, 25 runs 
 
DF test  Rej.   ADF test  Rej.  
pmut  min  median  max    min   median  max    
20  0.14  0.95  0.99  25 (25)  0.21  0.98  1.00  14 (12) 
100  0.91  0.98  0.99  21 (21)  0.94  0.99  1.00  18 (18) 
200  0.86  0.98  0.99  25 (24)  0.88  0.98  0.99  24 (23) 
1000  0.32  0.92  0.98  25 (25)  0.41  0.91  0.97  25 (25) 
2000  0.16  0.78  0.98  25 (25)  0.17  0.86  0.97  25 (25) 
4000  0.13  0.77  0.96  25 (25)  0.15  0.81  0.97  25 (25) 
10000  0.21  0.63  0.91  25 (25)  0.26  0.56  0.93  25 (25) 
Note: Table 3 shows estimates of the parameter ñ from a regression of the log exchange rate on its lagged 
value. The columns labeled ‘rejection’ give the number of cases  in which we can reject the unit root null 
hypothesis ñ = 1 from the one-sided (two-sided) DF and ADF tests. Again, the underlying data are the 
ones already analysed in Tables 1 and 2. Hence, for variation of the mutation probability, the minimum, 
median and maximum over 100 samples with 2,000 data points each are shown. For variation of the 
number of agents, only 25 samples were used due to the increase in computation time with increasing 
number of GA chromosomes.   23
 
Table 4: Variation of Tail Index Estimate from Real Coded GAs 
                   
Varying mutation probability pmut, constant mutation variance ómut = 0.1 and  population size N = 100 
Tail size 2.5 %  Tail size 5%  Tail size 10 % 
pmut  min  median  max  min  median  max  min  median  max 
0.01  1.33  2.53  4.75  1.46  2.51  3.85  1.49     2.26     2.94 
0.02  1.75         2.57  3.93  1.62     2.33     3.47  1.54     2.08     3.18 
0.03  0.81  3.01  6.89  0.85  2.57  3.33  0.67  2.24  2.70 
0.04  0.70  2.94  4.70  0.74  2.45  3.62  0.89  2.08  3.07 
0.05  0.96  3.23  5.02  0.73  2.68  3.62  0.85  2.33  3.09 
0.06  0.85  2.33  3.09  0.80  2.67  4.24  1.00  2.22  3.44 
0.07  0.91  2.98  5.98  1.11  2.60  4.60  0.71  2.24  3.29 
0.08  1.03  2.93  6.18  1.04  2.62  4.65  0.86  2.14  3.51 
0.09  0.99  2.72  6.44  1.03  2.35  4.63  0.93  2.02  3.67 
0.10  1.07  2.47  6.08  0.95  2.13  3.99  0.97  1.84  3.60 
                   
Constant mutation probability pmut =0.05, constant population size N = 100, varying mutation variance 
Tail size 2.5 %  Tail size 5%  Tail size 10 % 
ómut  min  median  max  min  median  max  min  median  max 
0.025  1.40  3.61  5.52  1.04  3.12  4.07  1.04  2.60  3.10 
0.050  1.37  3.46  5.56  0.92  3.00  4.32  0.77  2.54  3.38 
0.075  0.67  3.37  6.34  0.65  2.95  3.97  0.59  2.47  3.32 
0.100  0.78  3.28  5.03  0.79  2.77  4.08  1.00  2.27  3.07 
0.125  0.67  3.05  4.67  0.74  2.61  3.81  0.75  2.25  3.08 
0.150  0.70  2.91  5.15  0.89  2.57  4.41  0.71  2.14  2.99 
0.175  0.90  2.86  5.27  0.95  2.53  3.96  0.95  2.12  3.08 
0.200  0.95  2.85  4.78  0.95  2.40  3.88  0.97  1.98  3.04 
                   
Constant mutation probability pmut =0.05 and variance ómut = 0.025, varying population size 
Hill 2.5 %  Hill 5%  Hill 10 % 
N  min  median  max  min  median  max  min  median  max 
20  1.32  3.29  7.57  0.61  2.75  5.22  0.51  2.30  3.49 
100  1.46  3.85  6.08  1.49  3.16  4.22  1.41  2.68  3.23 
200  1.35  4.23  5.73  1.06  3.50  4.43  0.93  2.85  3.85 
1000  0.77  4.22  8.13  0.71  3.40  6.11  0.74  3.00  4.43 
2000  0.85  2.65  8.16  0.68  2.39  5.97  0.62  2.08  4.52 
4000  0.70  1.56  10.04  0.66  1.37  7.20  0.59  1.18  5.06 
10000  0.62  1.44  8.82  0.55  1.13  6.34  0.61  0.96  5.09 
20000  0.52  1.49  7.99  0.62  1.14  7.24  0.58  0.86  5.04 
  
Note: Table 4 shows estimates of the parameter á, now for real-coded GAs. Unlike in Figs. 1 to 3,  we 
always give the minimum, median and maximum over 100 replications with 2,000 data points each even 
in the case of varying number of agents (real GAs are less demanding in terms of computation time than 
binary ones). 
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Table 5: Variation of Index of Fractional Differentiation from Real Coded GAs 
                   
Varying mutation probability pmut, constant mutation variance ómut = 0.1 and  population size N = 100 
raw  squared  absolute returns 
pmut  min  median  max  min  median  max  min  median  max 
0.01  -1.06  -0.39  0.24  -0.28  0.09  0.41  -0.22  0.17  0.52 
0.02  -0.79  -0.05  0.25  -0.16  0.14  0.43  -0.22  0.24  0.55 
0.03  -0.44  -0.04  0.32  -0.14  0.13  0.90  -0.08  0.22  1.11 
0.04  -0.52  -0.06  0.22  -0.08  0.28  1.04  -0.10  0.40  1.07 
0.05  -0.44  -0.03  0.25  -0.11  0.25  1.17  -0.01  0.35  1.16 
0.06  -0.48  -0.08  0.29  -0.02  0.28  1.09  -0.03  0.40  1.23 
0.07  -0.52  -0.08  0.21  -0.11  0.30  0.87  -0.06  0.47  1.03 
0.08  -0.43  -0.07  0.22  -0.03  0.34  0.93  -0.04  0.48  0.99 
0.09  -0.52  -0.11  0.26  -0.01  0.34  0.89  -0.05  0.50  1.32 
0.10  -0.48  -0.13  0.17  0.05  0.35  1.00  0.06  0.53  0.92 
                   
Constant mutation probability pmut =0.05, constant population size N = 100, varying mutation variance 
raw  squared  absolute returns 
ómut  min  median  max  min  median  max  min  median  max 
0.025  -0.30  -0.01  0.34  -0.22  0.16  0.98  -0.10  0.24  0.98 
0.050  -0.48  -0.07  0.21  -0.40  0.19  1.03  -0.06  0.26  1.01 
0.075  -0.52  -0.04  0.30  -0.03  0.22  0.90  -0.04  0.29  1.14 
0.100  -0.39  -0.05  0.27  -0.09  0.30  1.14  -0.07  0.45  1.08 
0.125  -0.56  -0.06  0.31  -0.08  0.31  0.94  -0.18  0.46  1.03 
0.150  -0.42  -0.06  0.17  -0.10  0.31  1.05  0.01  0.43  1.10 
0.175  -0.50  -0.07  0.25  0.02  0.34  1.13  -0.06  0.49  1.07 
0.200  -0.46  -0.09  0.19  -0.21  0.35  1.00  -0.02  0.50  1.00 
                   
Constant mutation probability pmut =0.05 and variance ómut = 0.025, varying population size 
N  raw  squared  absolute returns 
  min  median  max  min  median  max  min  median  max 
20  -0.48  -0.02  0.46  -0.10  0.21  0.74  -0.07  0.29  0.89 
100  -0.37  0.00  0.21  -0.16  0.13  0.65  -0.16  0.20  0.71 
200  -0.60  0.01  0.30  -0.16  0.12  0.73  -0.18  0.15  0.81 
1000  -0.76  -0.02  0.40  -0.27  0.13  0.71  -0.26  0.22  1.05 
2000  -0.66  0.03  0.39  -0.31  0.11  0.85  -0.33  0.28  1.02 
4000  -0.79  -0.15  0.39  -0.31  0.10  0.39  -0.34  0.29  0.98 
10000  -0.72  -0.28  0.45  -0.30  0.13  0.86  -0.28  0.37  0.96 
20000  -0.75  -0.36  0.47  -0.13  0.10  0.86  -0.03  0.34  1.19 
Note: Table 5 shows estimates of the parameter d , now for real-coded GAs. The data are the same as in 
Table 4.   25
 
Table 6: Results of Unit-Root Tests for Real Coded GAs 
 
Varying mutation probability pmut, constant mutation variance ómut = 0.1 and  population size N = 100, 100 runs 
DF test  Rej.  ADF test  Rej.   
pmut  min  median  max    min  median  max     
0.01  0.29  0.90  1.00  74 (70)   0.42  0.94  1.00  59 (61)    
0.02  0.83  0.99  1.00  54 (49)   0.87  0.99  1.00  54 (49)   
0.03  -0.00  0.99  1.00  50 (47)  0.01  0.99  1.00  35 (34)   
0.04  -0.00  0.99  1.00  49 (42)  0.06  0.99  1.00  34 (30)   
0.05  0.01  0.99  1.01  46 (45)  0.26  0.99  1.00  39 (37)   
0.06  -0.00  0.99  1.00  55 (45)  -0.00  0.99  1.00  40 (34)   
0.07  0.00  0.99  1.00  56 (47)  0.00  0.99  1.01  40 (36)   
0.08  0.00  0.99  1.00  58 (51)  0.01  0.99  1.00  46 (40)   
0.09  -0.00  0.99  1.00  53 (48)  -0.00  0.99  1.00  48 (41)   
0.10  -0.00  0.98  1.01  68 (66)  -0.00  0.98  1.01  68 (63)   
                   
Constant mutation probability pmut =0.05, constant population size N = 100, varying mutation variance, 100 runs   
DF test  Rej.  ADF test  Rej.   
ómut  min  median  max    min  median  max     
0.025  -0.00  1.00  1.00  36 (30)   -0.00  1.00  1.00  25 (24)    
0.050  0.03  0.99  1.00  43 (32)   0.19  1.00  1.00  26 (21)    
0.075  0.01  0.99  1.00  51 (40)  0.01  0.99  1.00  34 (33)    
0.100  -0.00  0.99  1.00  69 (60)   0.31  0.99  1.00  54 (48)   
0.125  -0.00  0.99  1.00  68 (65)   -0.00  0.99  1.03  55 (53)    
0.150  -0.00  0.99  1.00  64 (58)   -0.00  0.99  1.00  46 (39)    
0.175  -0.00  0.99  1.00  76 (66)   0.12  0.99  1.10  50 (48)    
0.200  -0.00  0.98  1.00  72 (69)   0.02  0.99  7.71  60 (57)    
                   
Constant mutation probability pmut =0.05 and variance ómut = 0.025, varying population size, 100 runs 
DF test  Rej.  ADF test  Rej.   
N  min  median  max    min  median  max     
20  0.77  0.98  1.00  85 (79)  0.88  0.99  1.00  21 (17)   
100  -0.00  1.00  1.00  29 (24)  0.00  1.00  1.00  19 (15)   
200  0.99  1.00  1.00  2 (4)  0.99  1.00  1.00  4 (4)   
1000  -0.00  1.00  1.76  30 (38)  -0.00  1.00  24.74  31 (33)   
2000  -0.00  1.00  1.66  24 (33)  -0.00  1.00  6.11  27 (29)   
4000  -0.00  1.00  1.06  37 (50)  -0.00  1.00  1.02  35 (43)   
10000  0.01  1.00  1.52  45 (63)  0.01  1.00  12.52  44 (52)   
20000  0.12  1.00  1.03  43 (54)  0.12  1.00  1.01  42 (49)   
 
Note: Table 6 shows results from unit-root tests, now for real-coded GAs. The underlying data are the same 






Fig. 1.: A typical ‘realistic’ series of returns from a simulated economy with a binary-coded GA 
population of 100 agents. For economic parameters, see main text. GA parameters are: pmut = 




Fig. 2.: Log exchange rates from simulated economies with p mut = 0.01 (upper panel) and pmut = 
0.05 (lower panel). The population consists of 100 binary-coded GAs in both cases. Although 
not fully realistic, for parts of the upper time series the DF and ADF tests are unable to reject the 
unit root null. The simulation in the lower panel has more easily recognizable mean-reverting 






Fig. 3.: Log exchange rate (top), average portfolio fraction of home currency (middle), and average 
first-period consumption (bottom) for a real-coded GA population of 200 agents. For economic 
parameters, see main text. GA parameters are: p mut = 0.05, smut = 0.025 and g = 0.2. The 
dynamics seems to be characterized by unsystematic changes of the portfolio composition which 
lead to exchange rate fluctuations, but leave average consumption choices almost unaffected.   29
 
 
Fig. 4.: Log exchange rate (top), average portfolio fraction of home currency (middle), and average 
first-period consumption (bottom) for a real-coded GA population of 20,000 agents. For 
economic parameters, see main text. GA parameters are: pmut = 0.3, smut = 0.025 and g = 0.2. 
The middle and bottom panels show both the mean (solid lines) and standard deviations (broken 
lines) of the distribution of the choice variables within the population. In order to lodge the mean 
and standard deviation in the bottom panel, we have subtracted the steady state value c* = 7, 
reduced the standard deviation of ci(t) by one-half and magnified the standard deviation of fi(t) by 
a factor 10. The higher pmut compared to Fig. 3 mainly serves to decrease the amplitude of the 




Fig. 5.: Indifference curves. The underlying utility function is U = c (t) c(t+1), endowments are w1 = 
10, w 2 = 4. For this illustration it has been assumed that all agents have chosen their first-period 
consumption level equal to its steady state value, c* = 7 and that the fraction of domestic money 
in the portfolios of generations t and t+1 has mean values  ) 1 t ( f +  = 0.55 and  ) t ( f  = 0.5.   31
 
 
Fig. 6.: A snapshot of the evolution of the population corresponding to one upward half-cycle in Fig. 
4. The graph shows on its left-most part the distribution of choice parameters within a generation 
shortly after the lower turning point (triangles). The pluses and diamonds show the distribution of 
choice parameters within the same dynasty after 40 and 80 periods, respectively. 
 